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ARGUMENT 
The trial court's grant of Summary Judgment below is improper for two very 
significant reasons. First, there exists significant genuine issues of material fact as to the 
existence and nature of the hole that led to the Plaintiffs injuries. Even in the 
Defendant's Appellate Brief they continue to question the existence of the hole. The 
existence of the hole is a question of fact that precludes Summary Judgment in this case. 
Second, the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment on an issue of negligence, and 
specifically on an issue of latent defect, is based upon a question of reasonableness that 
must be left for the trier of fact. 
I. DEFENDANT HAD, AT LEAST, CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE 
DANGEROUS AND DEFECTIVE CONDITION UPON ITS PROPERTY 
Amazingly, even in Defendant's Appellate Brief, Defendant continues to question 
the existence of the hole. Defendant asserts, "Indeed, Kreyling has presented no one to 
confirm the cause of his fall, or the presence of the hole he describes." Defendant, in its 
Summary Judgment, relied upon statements of undisputed fact that indicated Plaintiff 
stepped into an "alleged hole." (R. at 274), that "it had been dished out, it was not a 
hole," (R. at 278), and "the size of the area Plaintiff alleges was a "hole" was nine inches 
deep near the gutter covered with leaves all over." (R. at 278). To the contrary, Mr. 
Kreyling testified that the hole into which he stepped was at least deep enough to fit his 
entire leg from foot to groin. (R. at 387-389). In Summary Judgment, the court was 
required to construe the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. 
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The existence and nature of the hole go directly to the question, for the finder of 
fact, as to the Defendant's negligence. In Utah, to determine whether a property owner 
had constructive notice of a dangerous condition resulting in a slip-and-fall accident, 
"constructive notice is imputed when the condition had existed long enough that the 
[store] owner should have discovered it." Jex v. JRA Inc., 166 P.3d 655, 658 (Utah App. 
2007). Although there exists disputes as to the size and nature of the hole, it was 
undisputed that the hole had been there for quite some time. Defendant's statement of 
undisputed fact, although mischaracterizing the hole as "nine inches deep" concedes it 
was covered by leaves all over. R. at 278. Mr. Kreyling testifies that he did not see the 
hole as "it was covered with cobwebs and leaves and stuff like that." Deposition of Jule 
Kreyling, hereinafter "Kreyling Depo." page 35 lines 15-16. Clearly, the hole had exited 
long enough for the gathering of debris and cobwebs. More telling, however, is the 
concrete driveway, poured on Defendant's property, with a semi-circle forming one side 
of the hole clearly being poured around some object in the ground. An examination of 
the photographs, supplied as Addendum C to the Defendant's Brief, shows that the 
concrete driveway, when originally formed, was poured around an object that was 
extending above the ground, creating a semi-circle edge of the driveway. Consequently, 
Defendant knew, or should have known, when concrete for the driveway was poured on 
their property that an object was in the ground next to the driveway. 
The trial court granted Summary Judgment even though it appeared that the defect 
in question had been present for a significant amount of time. More troubling, however, 
is that Summary Judgment was granted based upon a standard of "reasonable inspection." 
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Again, in Defendant's Brief, at page 21, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not presented 
evidence that the hole was even present. Obviously, the prior quotations to Plaintiffs 
deposition testimony suggest otherwise. Again, the significant disputed fact of the 
existence, and the nature of, the hole causes great question in determining whether it 
would have been found upon "reasonable inspection." The question of whether latent 
defect exists is a determination of whether the defect would not be discovered upon a 
reasonable and careful inspection. Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 
1978) (emphasis added). Consequently, the trial court issued Summary Judgment, 
asserting that such defect would not be found upon reasonable and careful inspection, 
even when there was a significant dispute as to the very existence of the hole. Again, the 
facts at Summary Judgment must be construed in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party. If the facts are construed, consistent with Mr. Kreyling's deposition, that a 
hole, the diameter of his thigh and deeper than his entire leg existed upon Defendant's 
property, it seems a significant enough defect that it would have been discovered upon 
reasonable and careful inspection. The trial court took this question away from the trier 
of fact. Utah law is clear, that when it comes to determining negligence, "courts are not 
in such a good position to make a total determination for here enters a prerogative of a 
jury to make a determination of its own, and that is: did the conduct of a party measure 
up to that of the reasonably prudent man and, if not, was it the proximate cause of the 
harm done?" Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Utah 1982). The trial court 
erred in making a determination of the Defendant's reasonableness. 
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II. DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE BRIEF DOES NOT DISAGREE THAT 
THERE EXISTS GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Plaintiffs Appellate Brief clearly questions the trial court's determination of 
Summary Judgment based upon genuine issues of material fact. Those issues deal with 
the nature and the existence of the hole in question. Defendant's Appellate Brief does not 
address this issue or even assert that there were no genuine issues of material fact. 
Rather, Defendant's Appellate Brief perpetuates those disputes of fact by continuing to 
question the existence of the hole. Consequently, it is clear that there exists genuine 
issues of material fact precluding summary judgment, 
III. PLAINTIFF DID NOT FAIL TO REASONABLY FORESEE A 
DANGEROUS CONDITION UPON THE PROPERTY. 
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was somehow negligent in failing to foresee or 
notice the dangerous condition which caused his injury. Defendant's Brief at page 20. 
For this proposition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff admitted he was aware of 
construction of the new senior center in the area, that an unidentified construction worker 
assisted him at the time of the accident, that there was no fence or barricade where he 
parked, and that he had the option of parking in a church parking lot, or at another 
location. 
Defendant fails to point out other very important factors. First, it is well 
established, contrary to Defendant's assertions that no excavation of the sidewalk or park 
strip area had occurred at the time of the accident. Mr. Kreyling testified as follows: 
Q. Let me ask you: on the date of the accident, was this area, if we're 
looking here, let me direct your attention to photograph #1. And this area to 
the - if you 're holding that photograph so that you're looking at it right 
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side up, in the top right hand corner of Exhibit Number 6, just to the bottom 
edge of his sidewalk area, you see on this particular photograph taken, 
whenever it was, that area is, you know, heavily excavated? 
A. It wasn't. It was just plain dirt right from there. It would look like 
this other side here. 
Q. It was all filled in roughly level with the sidewalk? 
A. Right. 
Kreyling Depo page 36, lines 12-23, page 37 lines 11-13. 
Mr. Kreyling testified that there were not cones, ribbons, or other safety devices 
marking off this area. Kreyling Depo at page 37. 
It is well established in this case, that at the time of the accident there was a 
construction site of the new senior center next door to the old senior center, but that the 
excavation that is apparent in the photos attached as Addendum C to Defendant's Brief, 
had not yet taken place. Consequently, it is misplaced to argue that Plaintiff should have 
been aware of a dangerous condition on the property, being the park strip, just because 
there was construction going on on the other side of the sidewalk and in the inner portion 
of the city block. 
IV. DEFENDANT CITY HAD A SPECIAL DUTY TO USE REASONABLE 
CARE TO PREVENT MR. KREYLING'S INJURY. 
Defendant asserts that it had no duty to Mr. Kreyling under the special use 
doctrine. Defendant attempts to assert that the adjoining property owner, being 
Washington County, made special use of driveways for the ingress and egress of its 
patrons thus creating a special use. Defendant's analysis is completely misplaced in that 
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the defective or dangerous condition was not the driveway. Rather, the defective or 
dangerous condition is a deep cylindrical hole abutting one of the driveways that crossed 
its property. City cannot rely upon the "special use" doctrine just because special use is 
made of a structure that is next to the dangerous condition. 
Furthermore, Defendant's Brief misconstrues the analysis of Rose v. Provo City, 
67 P.3d 1017 (Utah App. 2003). Defendant seems to suggest that the analysis of Rose 
required that the City "create" some dangerous condition in order to be jointly liable with 
the abutting property owner. Rather, the ruling in Rose, is that "it is long been the law in 
Utah.. .that a [city] has a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep streets which it has open 
for travel and which it has invited the public to use in a reasonably safe condition for 
travel." Rose v. Provo City, 67 P.3d 1017, 1022-1023(Utah App. 2003). There is nothing 
in that stated duty that suggests that it applies only to those dangerous conditions created 
by the city but, rather, applies to any dangerous condition upon the property. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is apparent that this case, at its core, must be 
remanded to the trial court due mainly to a significant dispute of material fact. In this 
case, the parties hotly contest the existence and the nature of the hole into which Mr. 
Kreyling fell and was injured. Based upon that contest, the court cannot reasonably rule 
upon issues of constructive notice or latent defect wherein the standard is discovery of the 
condition upon "reasonable and careful inspection." Even looking to issues of special 
use, the court must have a clear grasp of exactly what the dangerous condition was. 
Construing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, that there existed a deep 
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cylindrical hole next to a walking surface in the city-owned park strip questions of 
constructive notice and reasonable inspection must go to the trier of fact. 
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